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INTRODUCTION
In the many years since their inception in 1787,1 American
copyright and patent law have each grown beyond their original
meager bounds. Generations have struggled over the proper way to
cabin and define such a simple, but empowering phrase:2 “To pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries.”3 From this singular point, numerous
legislative amendments and common law rulings pulled the boun-
dary lines wider.4 As technology began rapidly progressing in the
twentieth century, the subject matter jurisdictions of copyright and
patent law saw healthy—and arguably gluttonous—growth.5 Wheth-
er the speed of progress, lack of understanding by adjudicators, or
disagreement among intellectual property scholars have separately
or jointly contributed to the expansion, the implications are clear:
the defining lines are neither definite nor linear. In response, this
Note establishes two overarching goals: (1) to properly relegate
copyright and patent law to their own separate fields; and (2) to
prevent either form of intellectual property protection from absorb-
ing sui generis6 territory unconfronted as new areas of idea and
expression emerge.
To put the problem of subject matter overgrowth in perspective,
imagine that a few decades from now a brilliant young architecture
student is visiting Los Angeles for the first time. While on a city
tour, the student is inspired by the sights, in awe of how artistic
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright Duration: Theories and Practice, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 133 (Peter K. Yu ed.,
2007) (discussing the interpretive rationales for and the history of copyright duration
language in the United States and internationally).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N RES. LIBR.,
http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline#.VR7SaVwKeg0
[http://perma.cc/H475-84YS] (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
5. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property Rights: Subject
Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 35, 39-40 (2010); see also infra Parts II-III.
6. Sui generis, a Latin term for “of its own kind/genus,” will be used principally in this
Note to refer to unique legislation or legal fields created solely to address intellectual property
that does not fit into preexisting categories, like copyright, trademark, or patent law.
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some of the buildings are. Nothing compares, however, to the beauty
of one particularly magnificent concert hall, resplendently covered
in steel and glass that artfully twists across the building’s surface.7
The student, taken in, leaves the city with a book full of sketches of
that building—an important milestone in her career. All of her
future work, whether designing office buildings or public parks, is
inspired and clearly reminiscent of her singular inspiration. But one
day, her inspiration turns to consternation, when a legalese-laden
letter crosses her desk. She is being sued for copyright infringement
of the concert hall’s design, for producing unlicensed derivative
works. “But these are buildings, bridges, and walkways,” she won-
ders, “they are functional, physical, and purposeful. They are much
more than simple paintings or poems!” But here, one man’s monopo-
ly on the design has become another’s complete restraint of creative
expression. And it is all because lawmakers have let the subject
matter of copyright sprawl to the point of choking out its once noble
goal: the pursuit of progress in the arts. This (albeit sensationalized)
future will not seem so foreign if Congress does not trim back and
redefine copyright and patent protections at their roots—their core
subject matter. In other words, instead of Congress or the courts
continually adjusting the round hole to accommodate the square
peg, they should consider, perhaps, introducing a square hole.
The existence of subject matter overgrowth is by no means a novel
realization, though it is not often discussed. Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau has pointed out in detail the boundary bleeding between
copyright, trademark, and patent law.8 Though he delves into a
discussion of reasons why this expansion may have occurred (a
subject beyond the scope of this Note), he concludes that academics
have not properly prioritized the balancing of the intellectual
property fields.9 In response to scholars like Beckerman-Rodau, this
Note goes a step further and seeks to become that balancing force.
By creating independent fields to hold the subject matter of
copyright and patent law, and applying strict rules as to what
7. An example materially inspired by the Walt Disney Concert Hall in Los Angeles.
About Walt Disney Concert Hall, LA PHIL, http://www.laphil.com/philpedia/about-walt-disney-
concert-hall [http://perma.cc/C79K-7N23] (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
8. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 5, at 39.
9. Id. at 88.
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matter may reside within the boundaries of those fields, questions
of what each law may protect would be resolved by looking at the
fields themselves. Unlike prior solutions that may focus on evolving
legal tests, this Note looks to set the barest definitions of copyright-
able and patentable subject matter. Beginning with properly defined
subject matter may secure a leash to the wild dog of expansive
intellectual property protections.
This Note further rejects the notion that the law should embrace
extensive overlap between copyrights and patents. Some scholars
view the expansion as complementary protection, a way of affording
an author the full spectrum of legal rights to their work.10 To the
contrary, this Note asserts that embracing the overlap is instead
apathy toward poorly defined subject matter. The overlap ought to
be minimized, and various components of a creative work should fall
into clear-cut bins of separate protection. In doing so, authors and
inventors will no longer toe the line between necessary control and
needless monopoly over their creations.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I explains Pasture Theory
as a new approach to subject matter definition.11 It will go beyond
the traditional concepts of “idea” and “expression”12 through a
metaphor of allocating works to discrete fields. Part II discusses the
expansion of copyright law and explains its rightful place as nested
in Pasture Theory. It discusses how the new theory would resolve
practical applications of copyright in architecture and computer
programming. Part III similarly discusses the slow creep of patent
law protections and how this theory would define and control it. It
also addresses patent law’s place in computer interface design, as
well as nonphysical creations. Finally, Part IV seeks to address
10. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (refusing to exclude dual protection
because of a lack of explicit exclusion by Congress, saying that “[n]either the Copyright
Statute nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted.”). But
cf. Sepehr Shahshahani, The Design of Useful Article Exclusion: A Way Out of the Mess, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 859, 860 (2010) (explaining that copyright should stay out of patent
law’s territory).
11. “Pasture Theory” is this Note’s invented terminology that derives its name from its
method of sorting subject matter into metaphorical, isolated fields, like animals set out to
pasture. See infra Part I.
12. These are fairly basic concepts commonly used in determining copyright infringement.
See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. REV.
321, 322-24 (1989).
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some of the major counterarguments to cutting back the intertwin-
ing of copyright and patent law. Specifically, it will assert the nu-
anced legitimacy of design patents, confront the illusion of peaceful
overlap in intellectual property law, and draw support for Pasture
Theory through constitutional and statutory history.
I. A PASTURE THEORY OF SUBJECT MATTER DEFINITION
The legal rules of copyright and patent law operate on specific
subject matter. Subject matter, unlike the rules or laws themselves,
answers the question of “What exactly do these rules govern?”
Pasture Theory13 is designed to address the problem of overlap
between copyright and patent at its source—the subject matter
itself. Pasture Theory, as a visual metaphor for subject matter
definition, begins with a broad view of intellectual property law: a
body of law to protect ideas in their various forms. This sets the
stage for the universe in which Pasture Theory operates: the subject
matter of ideas, or intellectual property. Before any defining or
organizing begins, ideas—in any stage of expression, creation, pro-
duction, or fruition—float freely about, unprotected, without boun-
daries. It may be helpful to picture Pasture Theory as an imagined
landscape, where different kinds of intellectual property are the
inhabitants of this new world.14 And Pasture Theory’s first step to
protecting those inhabitants is placing them in pastures with clearly
delineated fencing.
The first pasture is for copyright law. This pasture is defined by
“the expression of ideas.”15 Out of the wide universe, the only
13. “Field Theory” is admittedly a more concise and appropriate name, but it is
unfortunately already used widely in mathematics, physics, psychology, and sociology. In an
effort to avoid adding yet another alternate definition, this Note adopts a synonym.
14. Pasture Theory draws inspiration from prior works which make use of imagined
landscapes to make a point about society, science, or an academic theory. For one of the most
famous implementations, see generally EDWARD A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY
DIMENSIONS (Dover Thrift ed., 1992) (describing both Victorian society and the multiple
spatial dimensions through a satirical adventure of the narrator Square, as he explores the
imagined worlds of Spaceland, Lineland, and Pointland).
15. Although “expression” as used here is not synonymous with its use in the “idea-
expression” dichotomy, it is helpful to think of it as such. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (“[A]
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the
expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”).
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entrants to this domain are expressions, and expressions alone.
Expressions may be physical, like a statue, but their tangible fea-
tures must act only as a vehicle for their expression. All poems, all
songs, all stories, all pictures, and all paintings—however formed
and however inspired—romp freely through the field of “expression.”
This does not mean, however, that all of these expressions may, in
the end, achieve the safeguards of copyright law.16 They are merely
a pool of candidates from which few obtain the prize of copyright
protection. It is also important to note that these expressions should
not, by themselves, perform a function.17
The method of selection from this pasture is then governed by a
set of rules. The history of applicable copyright law is extensive and
occasionally contradictory, but at a minimum, it may be summed up
as this: any expression that is original to the author is worthy of
protection.18 So, from the field of all expressions, ignore any that
take directly from another expression. All expressions that are
copies of the ones before and all derivative works19 are overlooked.
The victors are a subset from this field of expression—the authors
to which are granted special authority over how others may use
their works. To be sure, it may be tempting to apply this body of
copyright rules to another pasture; it may be convenient or seem-
ingly intuitive to do so. However, it is important that copyright law
begins with its own pasture and applies its own rules to determine
those worthy of protection.
Of course, the rules of copyright law themselves are rife with nu-
ance: publication, licensing, fair use, and parody have their own ap-
plicable elements and are all proper subjects of their own scholarly
16. Such a distinction draws support from numerous other fields of law, such as the
difference between First Amendment “coverage” and “protection.” See Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (“Even before we see what a rule does, we must make the
initial determination of whether it applies at all.”).
17. Function, rather than expression, as a primary embodiment would suggest the field
of “fruition,” or the subject matter of patents. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2014).
19. That is, excluding derivative works by another, which are not originally inspired.
One’s own derivative works are the result of continuing to develop an originally inspired idea.
This Note views the latter as intended by “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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discussions. Pasture Theory is simply a framework upon which
these rules act and select the victors.
Neighboring the pasture of “expression” is a pasture of “frui-
tion.”20 Here one will find no mere descriptions, no simple sugges-
tions of ideas.21 Only concrete creations exist in this pasture. Any
object that exists in the world, that itself has mass and weight,
exists in this field. Also grazing here are the offspring of the con-
crete: any processes that are themselves acted upon by physical
objects. Physicality is a key criterion for the “fruition” creatures of
this pasture.22
Like the pasture of expression that exists for the whims of
copyright law, this pasture is subject to the application of its own
rules, the rules governing patent law. And these rules are much
more rigid. From this pasture of all manifest ideas, one cuts away
any thing that is itself not the first of its kind—which, admittedly,
is a laborious task of judging similarity to other related objects. Of
those creations that remain, one only permits “novel, useful, and
nonobvious” creations to receive protection.23 The inventors of the
creations that survive this strict set of rules are afforded the full
power and protections of patent law.
As intellectual property is not limited to copyright and patent
law, it would stand to reason that separate pastures would exist for
the application of trademark and other forms of intellectual
property. However, imagining how to define these fields must be
saved for another day; this Note concerns itself primarily with the
two aforementioned titans of intellectual property.
20. Literally, “bearing fruit.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2003). Fruition is purposeful, functional, and useful, as are patents.
21. It is necessary to draw a distinction beyond the traditional “idea-expression dichot-
omy” of copyright law. Pasture Theory applies a set of characteristics to the subject matter
itself, leaving a field of candidates. Thereupon a set of rules is applied, which are the rules of
copyright or patent law. Pasture Theory separates out the test for infringement into two
questions: Would this subject matter qualify for protection on a basic level? And, if so, would
the applied law grant that subject matter protection? For a fuller discussion on the idea-
expression dichotomy, see Samuels, supra note 12, at 322-24.
22. Because patent and copyright subject matter are to be meaningfully separated,
Pasture Theory calls for a “machine-or-transformation test” with “teeth.” See infra Part III.B.
23. These are familiar rules applied in the American patent system. See 1 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 3.01, 4.01, 5.01 (2014).
1994 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1987
Legislators and adjudicators are very much the masters of this
universe. As masters, they would realize that, as the various forms
of ideas are herded into their respective pens, the forms cannot be
in two places—or two pastures—at once. A beautiful new poem, once
confined to the pasture of expression, cannot simultaneously inhabit
the pasture of fruition, let alone even qualify to enter. A kitchen
device for cooking food, once happily placed in the pasture of frui-
tion, can be nowhere else, and likely belongs nowhere else. Of
course, at some point, the masters will encounter some new creative
form, something that may belong in one pasture or another. But,
when the masters finally do decide where it will roam, it proceeds
into only one pasture.24 In this way, the masters will never hesitate
to apply the appropriate and independent body of intellectual prop-
erty law; for when a form of idea exists only in one pasture, there
can be only one set of rules to apply to that pasture.
II. THE AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT LAW
To understand copyright law’s future under Pasture Theory,
understanding its history first may be helpful. This Part outlines
the rapid expansion of copyright over time and how Pasture Theory
would inject itself into the timeline today, preventing unchecked
growth in this new technological age.
A. The Rightful Place of Copyright Law
Since the Framers penned the Copyright and Patent Clause into
the Constitution,25 copyright law has undergone several legislative
revisions.26 These revisions sought to expand copyright’s purview,
in regard to term and nature of protection, and qualifications for
24. It is true that legislators or adjudicators may not be properly educated enough to make
an informed decision on where to fence new subject matter. See infra note 106 and accompa-
nying text. Though this Note alludes to this problem in Part III.C, it does not discuss the
necessary ways to assign expert judgments to new subject matter.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. Browsing through the various Copyright Acts can be a time-consuming endeavor, as
editions were passed in 1790, 1831, 1909, 1976, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, and later. See Copy-
right Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, supra note 4.
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protection.27 In the 1790 version of the Copyright Act, legislators
offered protection only for maps, charts, and books, and gave auth-
ors a limited monopoly for a term of fourteen years, which authors
could renew only once.28 Today, an author may acquire copyright
protection for a laundry list of creative works29 and is entitled to a
monopoly of those expressions for up to seventy years after the
author’s death.30
These protections come with a disclaimer: “In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process ... regardless of the form in which it is
described.”31 This appears to try to create a wall between copyright
and patent protection. However, this wall is a mirage, effectively
empty in light of controlling judicial opinions. Ever since Mazer v.
Stein, the courts have allowed creative works to be protected under
both copyright and patent law.32 In that case, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that a lamp, with a statuette of a dancer as its base,
could qualify for both copyright and design patents, and that the
courts ought not delineate.33 Further, in a landmark decision in
1974, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals expanded prior
rulings so that authors of creative works with ambiguous protection
rights did not even have to choose between copyright and patent
applicability.34 Essentially, certain creative expressions associated
27. What once was a maximum protection period of twenty-eight years circa 1790 became
a maximum protection period of well over a hundred years circa 1990. Id. 
28. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) (protecting any “map, chart,
book or books ... for the term of fourteen years” to be optionally renewed “for the further term
of fourteen years”). 
29. Works protected by copyright include, but are not limited to: “(1) literary works; (2)
musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accom-
panying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architec-
tural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (2012). For a critique of copyrighting architectural
works, see infra Part II.B.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
31. Id. § 102(b) (codifying the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541).
32. 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
33. Id.
34. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“Neither the copyright statute
nor the patent statute says that because a thing is copyrighted it may not be patented as a
design. We should not so hold.”).
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with functional components may receive dual protection.35 Such a
decision condones leaving protectable subject matter undefined.36
Under Pasture Theory, those with the power to grant copyright
protection must also be the ones to define and categorize the
underlying subject matter. Authors should not be put in a limbo of
undetermined protection. Admittedly, even with a proactive subject
matter definition, there are bound to be new works that have yet to
be categorized, and new types of creative works may exist in
temporary uncertainty. In these situations, authors ought to choose
their preferred method of protection. This “election of protection”
doctrine37 must reign, a conclusion opposite of the landmark ruling
in In re Yardley.38 One argument for this is that if no election occurs,
authors who broadly define their creative work are rewarded with
double protection; it is an incentive for laziness to reward indecision
with monopoly by both copyright and patent protections.39 Secondly,
requiring authors to choose between one mode of protection and
another would provide practical insight on both the protected object
and chosen form of protection. This would aid decision makers in
setting subject matter boundaries for that new form of creative
work.
B. Copyright in Architecture
One area in which copyright law has expanded to questionable
subject matter is that of architecture. Architecture’s protection un-
der copyright law is a recent development. Congress did not even
extend copyright protection to “all the writings of an author” until
the 1909 Copyright Act.40 Although not explicitly enumerated, archi-
tectural drawings found their protection couched in the language of
section 5: “[d]rawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical
35. Id. at 1395-96 (“The Congress, through its legislation under the authority of the
Constitution, has interpreted the Constitution as authorizing an area of overlap.”).
36. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 5, at 73-74 (discussing how Yardley’s dual
protection has sometimes led to overprotection of intellectual property).
37. This doctrine reflects the notion that “an author-inventor must elect between securing
a copyright or securing a design patent.” In re Yardley, 493 F.2d at 1394.
38. Id.
39. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1532 (2004).
40. Copyright Act of 1904, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976). 
2015] PASTURE THEORY OF CREATIVE CONTROLS 1997
character.”41 At that time, the wording of the Copyright Act would
have happily coincided with Pasture Theory. Even the major 1976
rewrite of the Copyright Act, which specifically included “technical
drawings, diagrams, and models,”42 would have comported with
keeping expression separate from function. After all, an author did
not have protection for—and could not prevent the construction
of—a designed building itself.
The situation changed in 1989 when the United States joined the
Berne Convention,43 which specifically addressed and protected
“works of architecture erected”44 in participating countries.45 To
adhere to the international pact, Congress passed the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA).46 For the first
time in U.S. history, a designer of architectural blueprints had the
ability to control the building’s construction. For the first time in
American intellectual property history, copyright protections took
a wild leap to the fruition of the idea itself.47 From then on, the
timeline of copyright in architecture departed sharply from satis-
fying Pasture Theory, as the AWCPA seeks to protect not only the
expression of the building’s design, but also the final functional,
physical form expressed within the blueprints.
This shift raises several policy concerns. First, allowing an author
to extend his control to the functional idea itself forced Congress to
sandbag the flood of copyright concerns with a slew of disclaimers
41. § 5, 35 Stat. at 1077.
42. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2543 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).
43. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 100-609 (1988) (explaining the Berne Convention
Implementation Act, to be implemented in subsequent years).
44. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 4-5, Sept.
9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2833, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force in United States on Mar. 1, 1989).
45. Currently, compliance with the Berne Convention is codified in the U.S. Code under
“architectural work,” which describes a “design of a building as embodied in any tangible
medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012).
46. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C.).
47. Raphael Winick, Copyright Protection for Architecture After the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41 DUKE L.J. 1598, 1602 (1992) (explaining that joining the
Berne Convention “forced a reexamination of the conception of architecture as a utilitarian
work under American law”).
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and restrictions.48 There came a chorus of questions: If architects
can copyright buildings, can I take a picture of one?49 If the build-
ing’s owner wants to alter it, does he need the architect’s permis-
sion?50 Any new work within copyright drags behind it a long chain
of questions about author control. Second, this legislative move may
have opened the door for future copyright extensions to other engi-
neering-related or technical drawings.51 Can concept drawings of a
car extend the author’s rights to the car itself? What about mobile
homes, which are arguably a hybrid between vehicle and architec-
ture? The decision to wholly envelop architecture nudged copyright
toward the edge of a slippery slope. Finally, Congress’s actions were
the result of an international pact, which does not account for two
centuries of balancing the various forms of intellectual property in
the American view of natural rights.52 In this instance, opening a
new door at the behest of a global community flies in the face of
decades of careful rights balancing among copyright, patent, and
trademark law.53 As a policy matter, Congress should consider its
own legislative and judicial history first.
Should scholars shift to adopt the premise of Pasture Theory,
Congress would be able to afford comparable protections to architec-
ture without violating the notion that copyright law operates solely
on the pasture of expressions. One option is through sui generis
legislation. Clearly, there are policy concerns above and beyond pro-
moting science and awarding an author a monopoly. A new area of
protection would better address contract law, economics, and other
considerations that inevitably arise with architecture. Perhaps
48. Congress quickly added a section restricting the “[s]cope of exclusive rights in
architectural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 120.
49. See id. § 120(a) (“The copyright in an architectural work ... does not include the right
to prevent the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or
other pictorial representations.”).
50. See id. § 120(b) (“[T]he owners of a building ... may ... make or authorize the making
of alterations to such building.”).
51. See Todd Hixon, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990: At Odds
with the Traditional Limitations of American Copyright Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 656 (1995).
52. See, e.g., Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended
Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71, 116 (1988).
53. See Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention
Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 787-91 (2003) (drawing most major conclusions of
imbalance toward southern countries, but his premise applies broadly to all participating
countries).
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architectural design might qualify as the shape or surface ornamen-
tation of a functional object, and thereby fall under the protection
of design patents.54 Conversely, Congress could spell out the same
protections through a right of action under some unfair competition
doctrine.55 However it chooses to promote copyright standards, Con-
gress could follow the values established in Pasture Theory and
avoid many of the policy concerns raised above.
C. Copyright in Computer Programs
If architectural design is a relatively new addition to copyright,
then computer programs are comparative infants to the realm of
protection. It was not until the late 1970s that Congress seriously
considered computer programs for official copyright protection.56 At
that time, the Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright
Works (CONTU) was still drawing similarities between computer
programs and music rolls for player pianos (after all, computer code
in that era was most often stored on magnetic strips).57 In 1980,
faced with a brand new form of expression, Congress followed
CONTU’s lead and added computer programs to the copyright
statute as “literary works.”58 Bolstered by the Copyright Office and
Congress’s approval on the matter, the Third Circuit completed the
government-branch trifecta with its own stamp of approval through
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. in 1983.59 The
great legal machine was on its way and picking up steam.
Barely over a decade later, Congress passed the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA),60 which made opinions then
54. See infra Part IV.A.
55. See Landrau v. Solis-Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 112 (D.P.R. 2007) (ruling that
a federal copyright claim did not preempt supplemental state claims of unfair competition for
architectural works).
56. NAT’L COMM’N ON ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT], available at http://perma.cc/VT2B-EMKN.
57. Id. at 10. Music rolls were not copyrightable, via a landmark Supreme Court ruling
that set the stage for music recorded in a non-visible, but tangible medium. See White-Smith
Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12 (1908). 
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”).
59. 714 F.2d 1240, 1240-41 (3d Cir. 1983).
60. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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favorable to Microsoft, Apple, and other producers of digital content
into law.61 The DMCA, in short, created a host of criminal sanctions
and penalties for bypassing access controls on digital information.62
Never before had any copyright-protected category received such
stiff enforcement for circumvention—after all, no one expects severe
criminal repercussions for improperly photocopying a textbook that
was hidden in an “off-limits” collection.63 As Pasture Theory would
suggest, lawmakers might have noticed that such special favoritism
perhaps indicated that digital copyright was a legal oddity, and that
the copyright spark in the late 1970s and early 1980s was unin-
formed rubber-stamping.
Buried after the CONTU’s joyous praise of computer programs as
literary works is a dissenting opinion by John Hersey, then Presi-
dent of the Authors League of America, and a hesitant concurring
opinion by Melville Nimmer, who—as the author of the leading
secondary publication on copyright—literally wrote the book on the
matter.64 These opposing views indicate a serious fault in the
CONTU’s discussion of copyright subject matter.
In the first opinion, Commissioner Hersey lays down the founda-
tion for rejecting computer programs from the pasture of expres-
sion.65 He passionately dissented, explaining that “the instructions
themselves eventually become an essential part of the machinery
that produces the results.”66 Unlike all other copyrighted works of
instruction that are directed to human consumption, these computer
programs are instructions to the machine. In essence, the code is a
functional configuration of computer resources and actions that
61. The DMCA gave producers of digital content additional remedies beyond civil action.
Id. at 2875-76. (“[I]t creates two new prohibitions ... one on circumvention of technological
measures used by copyright owners to protect their works and one on tampering with
copyright management information—and adds civil remedies and criminal penalties for
violating the prohibitions.”). See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1988).
62. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, § 1204, 112 Stat. at 2876.
63. Cf. id.
64. In all, there were fourteen members of the Commission, all from different parts of the
copyright process. One member died prematurely (to be replaced), and two commissioners
were ex-officio members. Nimmer was the Vice-Chairman of the Commission. See CONTU
REPORT, supra note 56, at ix. Nimmer wrote a treatise on copyright that stands as the
primary resource for reviews of law. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 18.
65. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 27-37. In all of the report, this is the best and
only real rebuttal to the overwhelming majority of approval.
66. Id. at 28.
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carry out specific tasks.67 Congress likely fell into the temptation of
taking an off-the-rack set of legal rules (copyright) and applying
them to something they thought of as only punch cards and perfor-
ated piano rolls.
The concurring opinion by Commissioner Melville Nimmer should
make modern scholars even more uneasy about digital copyright’s
foundation. Nimmer expressed serious concerns about construing
literary works so broadly.68 Although copyright law protected digital
music records at that time, computers and computer programs
produced something wholly new and previously unprotected by
copyright law.69 Further, Nimmer worried that lawmakers were
straining the original meanings of “author” and “writings” as
defined by the Constitution by not examining computer programs as
their own category of subject matter.70 Pasture Theory would
require a separate review of computer software as expression or
fruition, and as statement or function. When Nimmer, the most
quoted name in copyright, wants to slow down and take a harder
look at the facts71—and lawmakers instead forge ahead with the
majority opinion—there is serious cause for concern.
III. THE SLOW CREEP OF PATENT PROTECTIONS
Though its expansion may not be as rapid as that of copyright
law, patent law has also ballooned to protect subject matter previ-
ously unanticipated by lawmakers. This Part seeks to review the
long road of patent law developments and address how Pasture The-
ory contrasts with the current direction of patent law development.
A. The Rightful Place of Patent Law
Like copyright, patent law has come a long way since its humble
beginnings in the Constitution. The Patent Act of 1793 gave patent
law its first real footing in protection, providing it to “any new and
67. Id.
68. Id. at 26.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id. 
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useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter or any
new and useful improvement” thereof.72 The statute defined subject
matter rather simply. Yet Thomas Jefferson noticed that applying
the rules was much harder: when determining what actually quali-
fies for protection, the “subjects are such as would require a great
deal of time to understand and do justice by them.”73
The next major revision came in 1836, which affected not the
subject matter, but the process of applying rules.74 Congress founded
the Patent Office, along with a system of reviewing, numbering, and
issuing patents.75 From there, the Patent Office has proceeded to
expand, perfect, and increase its range of patentable objects. Oddly,
the original phrasing of the subject matter76 has not really changed,
yet new technologies have constantly challenged adjudicators to
interpret grounds for protection.77 The Plant Patent Act of 1930
provided for patenting plant varieties.78 In 1980, the Supreme Court
allowed patents for genetically engineered bacteria.79 Accordingly,
patent law seems to be constantly on the edge of both creative
production and mere scientific discovery.
Pasture Theory comes with a predetermined space for patent pro-
tection candidates. Those candidates include any physical object
that performs a function and satisfies the requirements of novelty,
usefulness, and nonobviousness. Also, they may include any process
or byproduct that is directly performed or produced by physical,
functioning objects, certain computer codes, steel-making processes,
chemicals, and the like. Clearly, physicality is key to being a
candidate for patent protection. With such an emphasis, the theory’s
pasture of fruition would rule out mere abstract processes or natu-
rally occurring things.
72. Patent Act of 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836).
73. A. HUNTER DUPREE, SCIENCE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A HISTORY OF POLICIES
AND ACTIVITIES 11-13 (1957).
74. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 312, 5 Stat. 117.
75. Id.
76. The statute defines subject matter as any “new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (matching the language from the Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318).
77. Id.
78. Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161-164 (2012)).
79. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
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B. Patent Law in Business Methods
Contained in the Patent Office’s criteria of a “new and useful
process, machine, manufacture”80 is uncertainty in the definition of
“process,” specifically with regard to business methods. Taken in its
broadest sense, a business method involves procedural steps, often
leading from input to output—the essence of a useful process. Yet,
establishing whether business methods qualify as subject matter
for patents has been a decades-long administrative and judicial
tennis match.81 Moreover, the Supreme Court only quite recently
established any satisfying test for qualifying business methods—
and even then this test is still under review.82 By adhering to
Pasture Theory’s mandate of the physical nature of patents, and
therefore processes, lawmakers might loose themselves from the
mire.
It is important to discuss some of the fleeting sentiments of what
makes business methods qualify as patents. Early on, there was no
distinction; business methods were reviewed under the same stan-
dards as new technologies.83 Then for a time, business methods were
not patentable at all.84 Computer processing changed that opinion
in the 1980s and 1990s.85 In the early 2000s, the U.S. Patent Office
80. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
81. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 987, 990-94 (2003).
82. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010) (discussing the “machine-or-
transformation test”). The Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. af-
firmed the “machine-or-transformation test” as a helpful clue to patentability, but not as a
definitive test. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012). The Court in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
International agreed with the Mayo test that screens out mere abstract or natural processes,
unless substantially transformed. 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014). For a fuller discussion on com-
puter-implemented methods in the wake—or ripple—of Alice, see Rob Merges, Symposium:
Go Ask Alice—What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS Bank? SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014,
12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-
after-alice-v-cls-bank/ [http://perma.cc/9T4T-VHSN]; see also David Kappos, Symposium:
Supreme Court Leaves Patent Protection for Software Innovation Intact, SCOTUSBLOG (June
20, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-supreme-court-leaves-
patent-protection-for-software-innovation-intact/ [http://perma.cc/TE7T-5JYY].
83. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AUTOMATED FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA
PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) 2 (2000), available at http://perma.cc/7GRD-
TTUX.
84. See Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1908).
85. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
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thought those methods must involve the “technological arts” but
internally reversed its position a few years later.86 The Supreme
Court, meanwhile, operated on a “machine-or-transformation test,”
which it could not agree on how to apply, or even if it was the sole
test to apply.87 In general, there has been a hazy nagging feeling
that somehow those business methods must connect back to technol-
ogy—that is, the “useful arts” mentioned over two centuries ago.88
To explain the application of Pasture Theory with regard to
business methods, it is necessary to flesh out one of the Supreme
Court’s more recent decisions. Bilski v. Kappos, decided in 2010,
clarifies one good, but not exclusive, test for business methods, the
“machine-or-transformation test.”89 As the Court of Appeals used it
below, this test approves a business method if: “(1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.”90 To be clear, the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected this test as a controlling test, for fear of re-
stricting what it saw to be a necessarily expansive Patent Clause.91
The Court was not, however, afraid to leave the door open for future,
better-worded, restrictive tests.92
Pasture Theory’s take on patents, like the machine-or-transfor-
mation test, requires an element of physicality. In this Note’s
response to Bilski, a better-worded test might be: “a process is
patentable subject matter if it is carried out by machines, is
constituted by other technologies, or directly acts upon an article.”
Cabining the language in physicality accomplishes two main goals.
First, it recognizes and conforms to a growing global sentiment that
business schemes are inherently nonpatentable.93 In free economies,
86. See Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004).
87. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
89. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3258 (“[W]hile the machine-or-transformation test has always been a ‘useful and
important clue,’ it has never been the ‘sole test’ for determining patentability.”) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
92. Id. at 3259.
93. Although the United States assuredly should not craft its laws based on global
sentiment alone, Congress should investigate Europe’s reasons for choosing to act differently.
The European Patent Convention excludes administrative business methods from patent
protection, choosing to only allow technological processes. See Convention on the Grant of
European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
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business should be allowed to freely compete. Second, physicality
maintains the separation from copyright’s pasture of expression. If
the prospective patent is solely an expression of an idea, with no
tangible substance behind it, then the patent protects little besides
a litigant’s right to bring suit over the intangible. Finally, if a
physical business method is largely computational, then the
accompanying requirements of novelty and nonobviousness should
themselves sift out physical processes that are merely manifesta-
tions of natural laws or abstract, mathematical concepts, which
have been long held to be nonpatentable.
C. Patent Law in Quasi-Natural Discoveries
It is well established that patent law will not protect the discov-
ery of mere facts.94 However, patent law will protect the invention
of a device or process that facilitates or makes use of such discov-
ery.95 In essence, until better processes are developed, an inventor
can temporarily guard the narrow path to a discovery with a rela-
tively small patent roadblock. Pasture Theory, however, begins to
take offense when the patented process is itself too close to some-
thing naturally occurring and nonpatentable.
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
a recent landmark Supreme Court decision, the Court settled that
DNA sequences could not be patented: “a naturally occurring DNA
segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely
because it has been isolated.”96 When the decision diverted from the
ideals of Pasture Theory in holding that complementary DNA
(cDNA), a synthetic string of organic code used to replicate a spe-
cific, corresponding DNA sequence, could be patented.97 At first
blush, it seems to comport with the prior notion of protecting the
94. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
96. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
97. Complementary DNA is both natural and synthetic. Though it is a product of a
laboratory, it is used to replicate naturally occurring DNA. Id. at 212. The Supreme Court’s
decision was akin to refusing to patent a house key, but finding that the key’s impression in
a clay mold—the best way to replicate a key—was perfectly fine to patent. In this case, if one
wanted to make an unprotected key, they would want to use, but could be kept from using,
protected key molds. Not exactly a win for progress in the sciences.
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“mechanical” processes behind the discovery. However, cDNA has
an extremely close relationship to the nonpatentable discovery—it
is an important and often necessary step in replicating its sister-
DNA sequence.98 By allowing patents on cDNA, the Supreme Court
permitted scientists to effectively control the corresponding DNA
sequence as well. Quasi-natural processes like this should be kept
outside the fences of the pasture of fruition, for they inherently
attempts to draw in matter that does not qualify.
Computer programs have been a touchy subject of quasi-natural
patents as well, especially when boiled down to basic mathematical
algorithms. The process of addition is obviously not patentable,
despite its many applications and uses in patentable machines. But
when a mathematic process becomes increasingly complex, the case
against patent protection begins to weaken.
In the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, the
Court implied that computer algorithms might be foreclosed from
patents altogether.99 Although the Court remained open to future
fact-finding, it explicitly disapproved, saying that “the patent would
wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”100 But the Court left the
door ajar, and technological progress began to wedge the gap
open.101 In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Bilski v. Kappos that
if a machine acts upon or transforms the state of some article, then
it may qualify for a patent.102 In 2014, Alice kept the door propped
open for computer-implemented methods that effectively transform
the nonpatentable, abstract subparts.103 Using this language as
support, inventors of financial algorithms can sometimes couch their
more abstract discoveries in terms of a computer-operated business
98. Id.; Adam Liptak, Justice, 9-0, Bar Patenting Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES (June 13,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/us/supreme-court-rules-human-genes-may-not-be-
patented.html [http://perma.cc/BFZ2-FNVX].
99. 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972).
100. Id. at 72.
101. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“[A] claim drawn to subject matter
otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula, computer program, or digital computer.”).
102. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221-22 (2010).
103. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2350 (2014).
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method and backdoor their mathematical patents.104 The machine-
or-transformation test as previously discussed is a thin veil
separating complex algorithms from mass patent protection—the
test requires teeth to be truly effective. Likewise, the test required
by Mayo and Alice leaves much to be desired in describing exactly
how transformed abstract ideas must be.105
Pasture Theory demands a greater distance from protecting
machine-operated processes. Just as the process of addition is not
protected simply because patentable cash registers make use of it,
so should the Court prohibit patenting more complex algorithms
despite their use in computers. Quasi-natural processes and materi-
als fly in the face of the pasture of fruition and should be treated
with special care. Only when computer code transcends complex
mathematics and accomplishes some greater purpose should it be
eligible for patents. When one considers that even the Supreme
Court Justices hesitate to rule a specific subject matter in or out,106
the case for special expert evaluation is made, perhaps even to the
point of carving out a new pasture.
IV. DEBUNKING COMMON COUNTERARGUMENTS
Not everyone sees the overlap of copyright and patent protections
as a problem, let alone a problem requiring a solution. This Part
seeks to clarify the purpose of intellectual property protections and
rebut what amounts to complacency in subject-matter overgrowth.
104. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370-
71 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
105. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an inventive concept sufficient to transform the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297-98
(2012).
106. Scalia admitted hesitation in ruling one way or another on highly technical matters,
stating, “I am unable to affirm those details on my own knowledge or even my own belief.”
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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A. The Legitimacy of Design Patents
As noted, copyright and patent law have both enjoyed consider-
able expansion in the last two centuries.107 However, one area of
patent law has not only suffered stunted growth, but has also
occupied the position of the tagalong little brother: design patents.108
Design patents are a form of intellectual property that protect the
design of a functional article, such as an article’s shape, surface
ornamentation, or artful configuration.109 Far fewer commentators
are properly acquainted with design patent history, and for the most
part, they pay unjustly little attention.110 Many would rather have
copyright and/or trademark law take over this area, to allow design
patents to die a quiet death.111 Pasture Theory, in separating out the
fencing for expression or fruition, requires design patents to occupy
the field of patent law. Without it, administrators of the fields will
continue to expand the boundaries of copyright protection, beyond
its intended territory.
Despite one popular theory that design patents were a historical
accident of patent law, they were actually created to satisfy a
specific need.112 Design patents were introduced in 1842 to fill a gap
in protection—manufacturers were tired of competitors stealing
their product designs and demanded recourse.113 When advocating
the need for design patents, Patent Commissioner Henry Ellsworth
borrowed heavily from the language of British copyright law,114 in
undertones that understandably led design patents to fall behind
less-strict copyright and trademark regulations in terms of popular-
ity. When patent law underwent several revisions over the years,
the statutory language behind design patents has gone largely
107. See supra Parts II-III.
108. See Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent
Protection, 88 IND. L.J. 837, 841-42 (2013).
109. CHISUM, supra note 23, § 23.03[1]. A good example of a prospective design patent is
the distinctive shape of a Coca-Cola bottle.
110. See Du Mont & Janis, supra note 108, at 841-42.
111. See id. at 843-44.
112. Id. at 847.
113. Id. at 864.
114. Id.
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unchanged.115 Briefly put, “whoever invents any new, original and
ornamental design” for a manufactured product may obtain protec-
tion under the same criteria as utility patents.116
In recent years, design patents gained a spurt of much needed
attention. In 2008, the Federal Circuit made it substantially easier
to prove infringement in design patent litigation, enforcing the “ord-
inary observer” test as the sole determinant.117 Essentially, under
this test, an infringer is liable if an ordinary observer, paying only
the attention usually given when making a purchase, would find
substantial similarity between two products.118 Apple used this new
rule to particular effect four years later, winning several counts of
cell phone design patent infringement against Samsung.119 With
such a clear victory in the public eye, it would be unsurprising if
other product manufacturing companies begin to follow suit.
Some see design patents as yet another blanket of protection to
wrap their creations in the full force of the law.120 However, Pasture
Theory would assert that it is merely one way to keep copyright out
of patent law’s territory. Design patents must act as a wall, not a
bridge, and alone guard the ornamentation of physical, functioning
objects. When copyright law plays the same game, the courts run
into problems, like in Mazer v. Stein, with duplicative protection.121
Moreover, overlap leads courts to implement complicated tests to
see if the copyrighted aesthetic features could stand alone without
the physical, functioning object.122 Copyright requires complicated
aerobatics to accomplish the same job that design patents already
do—protecting the physical form of the functional object. If design
patent law were allowed to expand and evolve as copyright or utility
patents have over the years,123 then it might properly protect object
115. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (showing no substantive revisions since the turn of the
twentieth century).
116. Id.
117. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding
that the ordinary observer test must be conducted in the light of prior art).
118. Id. at 670.
119. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2012 WL 3071477 (N.D.
Cal. July 27, 2012).
120. See Moffat, supra note 39, at 1512-13.
121. 347 U.S. 201, 214-18 (1954).
122. Id. at 204-05.
123. See Du Mont & Janis, supra note 108, at 874.
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ornamentation without any confusing intrusions from the pasture
of expression.
B. The Illusion of Peaceful Overlap
As much as intellectual property rights have undeniably seen
huge subject matter expansion, more and more the reality is that
the various fields may afford simultaneous protection.124 Software,
for example, may be protected by copyright or patent law.125 Cloth-
ing, as well, may be afforded dual protection if the creator knows
how to effectively describe her designs.126 It is very difficult to see
any issue with overlapping subject matter when looking through the
eyes of a humble inventor protecting her creative works.
More so, a handful of modern landmark court cases perpetuate
this happy illusion. Mazer established that having one form of
intellectual property protection should not foreclose another.127 In
re Yardley went even farther to say that a creator did not even have
to elect between his available protective options.128 Although the
courts have come up with doctrines that may tend to channel a work
toward one form of protection or another, they have left the door
open for overlap.129 Inevitably, a new type of creation comes along,
blurs the old line-drawing test, and falls into the gap that courts
intentionally created.
Following the tenets of Pasture Theory, apathy may lead to as
much intellectual property overgrowth as deliberate encouragement.
Apathy has led copyright, patent, and trademark law to all grow
much larger than their original boundaries. Thankfully, policy con-
cerns and countervailing incentive structures have tempered and
balanced that growth through their respective objectives.130 But
when the fields start to overlap, they interact with each other’s
careful balancing act of policy, incentives, and legislative history.131
124. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 5, at 39.
125. Id. at 74-75.
126. Id. at 76-77.
127. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
128. 493 F.2d 1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
129. See Moffat, supra note 39, at 1475.
130. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 5, at 39.
131. Id.
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Each form of protection, building its tower of oversight higher and
wider, has begun to encroach, shove, and topple the others.
The story becomes even more concerning when examining the
harm that befalls the public.132 Take, for example, a creator with
dual patent and copyright protection for a widget. For a time, the
creator enjoys near-absolute monopoly on producing the widget. As
a compromise for the patent monopoly, the creator was instructed
to disclose his new idea, so that others may soon improve and make
advancements. But even after the patent period runs dry, copyright
protection lingers long after, threatening to invalidate any improve-
ments to that dead patent.133 What once was a fair trade between
the public and the monopolist is no longer fair nor a trade.134
Consider also the patent trolls (otherwise known as nonpracticing
entities) already present in the manipulation of intellectual property
law.135 Patent trolls use their rights in broad patents to intimidate
practicing businesses into settling a potentially protracted and
painful infringement suit.136 This behavior dampens innovation and
tarnishes the societal agreement patent law creates.137 Imagine how
much worse these trolls may become with ever-expanding and
overlapping rights. Settlements for one cause of action may not
eliminate another threat. Copyright longevity may perpetuate a
troll’s stranglehold for much longer. When we consider subject mat-
ter and protection overlap, we must look beyond the intended users
and consider the unintended abusers as well.
Finally, at their origin, Congress wrote patent and copyright law
to award monopolies for “limited times,” to promote the progress of
science and the arts.138 How can science and the arts progress if that
limited time may be combined and expanded, and that monopoly
becomes a vice grip of protective overlap? Perhaps Congress inten-
132. See Moffat, supra note 39, at 1512-13.
133. See id.
134. Id.; see also id. at 1480 (discussing the various cost-balancing considerations that go
into granting personal monopolies).
135. See Todd Klein, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 295 (2007).
136. See id. at 299-301.
137. See id.
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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ded permanent separation from the very start; for that, one must
look to legislative history.
C. Legislative & Historical Interpretation
When determining legislative intent, there are few places more
authoritative than the actual text of the Constitution. Many schol-
ars draw particular consternation with adhering strictly to the
parallel structure of the Copyright and Patent Clause: “To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries.”139 But the framers themselves were
well aware of the distinctions they were drawing between (1)
authors and their writings and (2) inventors and their discoveries.140
The acts that circulated just prior to 1787 indicate that the catego-
ries were factually distinct.141
The British Statute of Anne had been promulgated through the
colonies since 1710.142 The similarities between this text and that of
the Constitution make it clear that the Framers drew their inspira-
tion for copyright law from this source.143 Further, though copyright
and patent were constitutionally declared as one, colonial state laws
do much to clarify the Founders’ intent to separate the two. Three
states had passed private copyright acts prior to the Articles of
Confederation in 1783,144 and by then, though the Continental
Congress had no power to create federal copyright law, it heavily
encouraged states to provide for it.145 These laws were wholly
independent of patent laws, which were state-level and often case-
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1951).
141. 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting of
the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times
therein mentioned.”).
142. Oren Bracha, The Statute of Anne: An American Mythology, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 877, 877-
78 (2010). 
143. Id.
144. PETER YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND
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specific commercial rights to product manufacturing.146 After the
Articles, some states, such as South Carolina, passed individual
patent laws.147 The Constitution, in a tidy sentence with parallel
structure, made these two realms a federal issue in one fell swoop,
to be properly expanded later and separately.
Just three years after 1787, Congress passed two discrete acts,
one each for copyright and patent.148 From the very start, the two
acts exacted very different standards on authors and inventors,
expecting much more from inventors.149 Further, copyright and
patents, from nearly the start, had very different concepts of “origin-
ality.”150 Copyright was designed for expressions that were original
to the author.151 Congress designed patent law for creations that
were original to the nation.152
If the two protections were intended to overlap, arguably there
would have been some overlap in administration, recording, or
issuing of the two fields. But here too copyright and patent differed.
Originally, copyright claims were recorded by clerks of U.S. district
courts.153 Those efforts were later consolidated in 1870 into a central
office overseen by the Library of Congress.154 Conversely, solely the
Secretary of State, Secretary of War, or the Attorney General
originally issued patents.155 A separate office did not form until 1836
when it was clear that funneling all patents through three men was
unmanageable.156 Today, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office is
146. See Camilla A. Hardy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 45, 48-49 (2013).
147. Henry A. M. Smith, The Baronies of South Carolina, 13 S.C. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL
MAG. 4 (1912).
148. See supra Parts II-III.
149. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (high-
lighting the differences between copyright and patent in both protections and qualifications).
150. Compare Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991), with 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1952).
151. See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1952).
153. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html [http://perma.cc/3Y28-GWBE] (last visited
Apr. 3, 2015).
154. Id.
155. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
156. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
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governed by the U.S. Department of Commerce.157 The only common
historical link between copyright and patent administration was the
Secretary of State, whose probable limited interest in the matter
was staying apprised of both scientific developments and the latest
maps and charts. With no meaningful link in administration, it is
less likely the original intent was to overlap the distinct fields.
Some scholars may argue that original intent is meaningless in
light of two centuries of technological progress, and that intellectual
property law should live to adapt to the changing times.158 However,
when intellectual property depends on balancing incentives and
social policy concerns, so too does it depend on every year and act in
that historic foundation.159 Consistency in patent grants or copyright
protection cannot be realized if the decades of prior grants and
protections are ignored. One cannot build a strong tower by starting
with the roof.
CONCLUSION: REDEFINING FROM THE START
In the garden of intellectual property, copyright and patent law
have grown wildly over the years. Unattended by gardeners who
might properly fence them in, copyright and patent law have become
entangled by the roots and fight for room in the light. Some scholars
have begun to realize that with all the overgrowth, society cannot
come and reap the fruits of its labor. For these reasons, it is time to
properly sequester copyright and patent law to their own fields,
starting from the ground up.
Pasture Theory seeks to do just that, by restraining the rules of
copyright law and patent law to operate on independent subject
matter. For copyright law, there is the pasture of expression. Here,
all writings and all creative works that express an idea—and not
the idea itself—are kept to be selected out by the rules of copyright.
Neighboring this field is another, the pasture of fruition. There,
157. Department Organization Chart, U.S. DEPARTMENT COMM., http://www.commerce.gov/
sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2014/department_organization_chart.pdf [http://perma.
cc/V96U-4TKY] (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
158. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1819
(2006).
159. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 5, at 44-46.
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anchored by elements of tangibility and function, are all physical
creations and the processes operated upon by machines. The rules
of patent law award a select few from this field the gift of protection.
When someone produces a new creation of a type yet unallocated to
either pasture, it is up to the masters of this universe to choose a
field, or a new field, and to decide early. Creations must not be left
to wander outside the gates if their creators seek to protect them for
themselves.
Part of this process also involves cutting back the overgrowth.
Copyright, for one, has extended into architecture and computer
programs. Neither of these fit comfortably in the intended subject
matter of copyright law. Patent law has also crept beyond its
bounds, protecting business methods with weak physical ties, and
quasi-natural discoveries that the courts do not completely compre-
hend. Perhaps it is time that these areas be given their own
pastures with sui generis legislation, not instead forced into
categories defined long ago at the birth of the nation.
Finally, scholars must not accept this overlap in protection
lightly. These intellectual property protections were created ex-
pressly to promote the sciences and useful arts, but when mon-
opolies are compounded, the delicate societal compromises are
destroyed. Existing policy and incentive structures are upset when
those protections persist beyond their intended lifetime. These
fields were never intended to overlap, and the best way to stop and
even reverse the overgrowth is by putting up the proper fencing
now, through Pasture Theory.
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